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NECESSARILY UNPREDICTABLE? OIL SPILL RISKS
BEYOND THE HORIZON
Jamison E. Colburn*
The occurrence of oil spills is fundamentally a matter of
probability. There is no certainty regarding the amount of
oil that would be produced, or the size or likelihood of a
spill that would occur, during the estimated life of a given
lease sale. . . . A probabilistic event such as an oil-spill oc-
currence or oil-spill contact to an environmentally sensitive
area cannot be predicted, only an estimate of its likelihood
(its probability) can be quantified.1
Oil spills are and will remain a fact of life, probably until the oil is
gone. The principal "environmental" statute constraining our Department
of Interior's oversight of "deepwater" oil development in the Gulf of Mex-
ico (and the rest of our "outer continental shelf") has been the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). 2 In retrospect, of course, that over-
sight left a lot to be desired, arguably implying that NEPA leaves a lot to be
desired. And indeed, it does. But the lessons from the BP oil spill are
rather less intuitive than some have argued.3 This Article will sketch
NEPA's now shop-worn structural flaws, three of the major pivots in
NEPA practice today, and a focused look at the actual NEPA process that
led to the Deepwater Horizon tragedy last summer. It will also consider
briefly our culture's understanding of so-called "low-probability" risks on
the way to proposing several needed changes in how our federal agencies
assess and take environmental risks consistent with our "foundation of en-
vironmental policymaking in the United States," NEPA.4
* Professor of Law, Penn State University.
1. MINERALS MGMT. SERV., OIL-SPILL RISK ANALYSIs: GULF OF MEXICO OUTER CONT'L
SHELF (OCS) LEASE SALES, CENT. PLANNING AREA & W. PLANNING AREA, 2007-2012, & GULFWIDE
OCS PROGRAM, 2007-046, http://www.boemre.gov/itd/pubs/2007/2007-040.pdf [hereinafter OCS REP.
MMS 2007-040].
2. National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370f (2006). NEPA's purposes pre-
amble explicitly invoked "the profound impact of man's activity on the interrelations of all components
of the natural environment, particularly the profound influences of population growth" and "resource
exploitation," forces that had to be checked if the "conditions under which man and nature can exist in
productive harmony" were to be achieved. Id. § 4331(a).
3. See, e.g., ALYSON FLOURNOY ET AL, CTR. FOR PROGRESSIVE REFORM, REGULATORY BLOW-
OUT: How REGULATORY FAILURES MADE THE BP DISASTER POSSIBLE, & HoW THE SYs. CAN BE
FIXED TO AVOID A RECURRENCE 35-42 (2010) (arguing that MMS, among other things, should have
been required to complete a "worst case scenario" analysis, required to avoid "tiering" its NEPA docu-
ments, and not permitted to use "categorical exclusions" in specific NEPA determinations).
4. MINERALS MGMT. SERv., OUTER CONT'L SHELF OIL & GAS LEASING PROGRAM: 2007-2012,
FINAL ENVTL. IMPACT STATEMENT App. D, D-1 (MMS 2007-03), http://www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-
2012FEIS/AppendixDLaws.pdf [hereinafter PROGRAMMATIC EIS].
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NEPA's genius was its generality and simplicity. The statute com-
mands no particular environmental outcomes. It is not limited in scope to
classes of industry or measurable degradations of air or water or soil qual-
ity, to losses of species, or creations of new toxins; it governs irrespective of
motive, purpose, or point. NEPA requires that "all agencies of the Federal
Government shall . . . include in every recommendation or report on pro-
posals for legislation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting
the quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the respon-
sible official" stating the environmental impact of the proposed action, any
unavoidable adverse environmental impacts should the action be taken, al-
ternatives to the proposed action, and other information useful in deciding
whether the reasons for the proposal outweigh or otherwise defeat the rea-
sons against it.5 NEPA § 102 also directs the same agencies to "utilize a
systematic, interdisciplinary approach which will insure the integrated use
of the natural and social sciences and the environmental design arts in
planning and in decision making which may have an impact on man's envi-
ronment." 6 This "stop and think" mandate,' when combined with the
"study and integration" mandate, might seem to imply a kind of fiber-delib-
eration duty. But it would be a misleading implication-one that obscures
several latent complications in our concept of law and, thus, our under-
standings of NEPA as law.
First of all, the Supreme Court has made clear that suits to affect ad-
ministrative agencies' allocative choices face a heavy presumption against
judicial relief.8 As the United States Supreme Court has made increasingly
clear, to be brought into court along the usual routes, an agency's action
"must be one by which rights or obligations have been determined, or from
which legal consequences will flow." 9 Many have criticized this norm at the
Court,10 but the critiques seem to have had little effect. For a variety of
reasons grounded in our separation of powers, the judiciary has resisted
becoming the tip of the sword in projects such as NEPA § 102(2)'s study
and integration requirement." By contrast, NEPA § 102(2)'s "stop and
5. 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C).
6. Id. § 4332(2)(A). Separately, § 102(2)(B) requires all agencies to "identify and develop
methods and procedures. . . which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and
values may be given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and technical
considerations." Id. § 4332(2)(B). Combined, these are NEPA's "study and integration" mandates.
7. "If NEPA mandates anything, it mandates this: a federal agency cannot ram through a pro-
ject before first weighing the pros and cons of the alternatives." Simmons v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers, 120 F.3d 664, 670 (7th Cir. 1997).
8. "Allocative" decisions in this sense include decisions to take or not to take enforcement
action of various kinds, see, e.g., Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 837-38 (1985), decisions as to the
expenditure of lump-sum appropriations, see, e.g., Lincoln v. Vigil, 508 U.S. 182, 190-92 (1993), and
decisions to take or not to take so-called "programmatic" actions. See, e.g., Norton v. S. Utah Wilder-
ness Alliance, 542 U.S. 55, 66-67 (2004).
9. Bennett v. Spear, 520 U.S. 154, 177-78 (1997) (internal quotation marks and citations
omitted).
10. See, e.g., Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation in Administrative Law, 60 AD-
MIN. L. REV. 1 (2008).
11. Some courts have even gone so far as to hold that the statute's "detailed statements" called
forth in § 102(2)(C) can fully satisfy an agency's duty under § 102(2)(A). See, e.g., Save our Sycamore
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think" mandate-its "detailed statement" requirement-has become a sta-
ple of federal court practice for most of our last four decades.' 2 Indeed,
some aspect of this requirement has come before the Supreme Court no
fewer than sixteen times.' 3 This vein of NEPA's has arguably even influ-
enced our administrative law's "reasoned decision making" jurisprudence
more generally.' 4 As part III will show, though, too much of NEPA's stop
and think mandate today takes the form of guidance to federal agencies
and is not, in any simple sense, law. Thus, understanding its status in our
legal system has become part of NEPA's increasingly ambivalent legacy.
One net result of the above is that NEPA law tends to focus us on
discrete, identifiable instances of agency choice while the broader picture
of agency rationality recedes from view. The broader picture-a picture
that might include, for example, an agency's decision to forego directed
study of certain nettlesome variables in issues it routinely encounters-is
virtually invisible to NEPA. Thus, systemic failures go unremedied. In-
deed, they often go unrecognized. An agency that repeatedly and insis-
tently failed to study a risk arising routinely in its practice and that
promised to continue to arise in the future might be called irrational in
every sense-and still survive almost any challenge alleging a failure of
NEPA compliance. NEPA § 102(2)'s study and integration mandates are,
in short, potentially powerful but essentially left out of NEPA practice
today.
A second problem is how its administrator has been responding to
NEPA's shortcomings: through a turgid flow of guidance, memoranda, cir-
culars, and the like, none of which authoritatively resolve any of NEPA's
shortcomings.' 5 These tools have their place, but they are poorly chosen if
and to the extent that their user expects they will change agency conduct
that has powerful reasons behind it. The Council on Environmental Qual-
ity (CEQ), NEPA's administrator, must rethink its belief that it can update
NEPA without updating its NEPA rules. To be sure, this problem is more
deeply and broadly rooted, but it will have to be confronted if federal regu-
lators are to better manage risks like catastrophic oil spills.
v. Metro. Atlanta Rapid Transit Auth., 576 F.2d 573 (5th Cir. 1978); Save Our Invaluable Land (SOIL),
Inc. v. Needham, 542 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1976); Pa. Protect Our Water & Envtl. Res., Inc. v. Appalach-
ian Reg'l Comm'n, 574 F. Supp. 1203 (M.D. Pa. 1982).
12. See, e.g., DANIEL R. MANDELKER, NEPA LAw & LITIG.: THE NATI'L ENv-L. POLICY Acr
2-10 (2d ed. 1996).
13. See Richard J. Lazarus, When a Loss is Almost a Victory, 26 ENVTL. F. 14 (Mar./Apr. 2009),
available at http://www.law.georgetown.edu/faculty/lazarus/docs/columns/LAZARUS.FORUMMarch
AprilinalColumn.pdf.
14. See, e.g., Jason J. Czarnezki, Revisiting the Tense Relationship Between the U.S. Supreme
Court, Administrative Procedure and the National Environmental Policy Act, 25 STAN. ENVT. L.J. 3
(2006).
15. See infra note 147 and accompanying text.
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I. NEPA IN PRACTICE TODAY: DOCUMENTS,
DECISIONS, AND DEFERENCE
If there is one sure thing NEPA has revealed about us in its four de-
cades, it is this: we do not know the value of information. This is not to
complain that our priorities are askew (although they may be). It is to
observe that we are not very good at valuing information accurately, espe-
cially information about environmental risk. NEPA is written and struc-
tured as if this information is easily gathered, easily sorted, and easily
absorbed by those who make decisions for the public. Quite to the con-
trary, "information about the environmental consequences of our actions is
not free, abundant, and unerringly accurate, but is more typically scarce,
costly to assemble, highly uncertain, and variable in quality."16 Getting us
to think probabilistically about environmental risk-and to expertly man-
age the "plan uncertainty" that inevitably arises within any such
calculus"-has been a constant negotiation between NEPA as it was legis-
lated, NEPA as it actually works in our legal system, and NEPA as it might
be reformed in the future.
NEPA's "Council on Environmental Quality" (CEQ) established rules
in 1978 that divide all agency actions into three categories: those that nor-
mally do,18 those that normally do not,' 9 and those that may or may not 20
require one of NEPA's "detailed statements" on environmental impacts
and alternatives to the proposed action.2 ' Into at least one of these three
categories the sum total of all NEPA-governed actions across our sprawling
federal agencies must fit.2 2 Only about 500 or so actions a year draw a full
EIS today.23 Best estimates are that some 50,000 or more assessments are
done annually to determine whether a full impact statement is necessary. 2 4
16. Bradley C. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA: Monitoring and Managing Government's
Environmental Performance, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 903, 926 (2002) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Toward a
Smarter NEPA].
17. See Dave Owen, Probabilities, Planning Failures, and Environmental Law, 84 TUL. L. REV.
265 (2009) (describing the general phenomenon of "plan uncertainty" and environmental law's failure
to account for plan uncertainty when requiring particular environmental outcomes).
18. 40 C.F.R. § 1501.4(a)(1) (2010).
19. Id. § 1501.4(a)(2).
20. Id. § 1501.4(b).
21. In making the foregoing determinations, the action agency may proceed "under its proce-
dures" for NEPA compliance. See id. § 1501.4(a). Thus, departmental manuals, circulars, and guidance
fill the void between these three kinds of NEPA actions and agency operations more generally. At the
Department of the Interior, for example, the DO! Manual specifies to personnel which departmental
actions normally necessitate one of these NEPA decisions. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR, DEPARTMEN-
TAL MANUAL pt. 516 (1978), http://elips.doi.gov/app-dmlindex.cfm (last visited June 27, 2011).
22. The pigeonhole that has attracted the most attention from courts, commentators, and action
agencies has been the "may or may not require a detailed statement," depending on the context. See
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA, supra note 16, at 920 -24. "[Ojver the longer run of cases, no
clear standard of 'significance' has emerged," leaving agency managers a lot of discretion in deciding
whether their agencies actions should trigger NEPA's threshold for an environmental impact statement.
Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA, supra note 16, at 920.
23. See Ted Boling, Making the Connection: NEPA Processes for National Environmental Policy,
32 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 313, 320-21 (2010).
24. See Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA, supra note 16, at 920.
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And no one knows how many "categorical exclusions" materialize in a
given year.25
CEQ has long insisted that NEPA's goal is better decisions, not better
documents. A convergence of many causes, however, has led to a lopsided
focus on the latter and our acute and continuing frustrations as to the for-
mer. A Presidential Task Force in 2003 noted NEPA's own congenital de-
fect and its role in this failure of implementation:
In the 1997 [twenty-five-year] study, CEQ recognized that
the environmental protection afforded by the traditional en-
vironmental management model, "predict, mitigate and im-
plement," depends on the accuracy of the predicted impacts
and expected results of any mitigation. The study con-
cluded that a "major difficulty with the traditional environ-
mental impact analysis process is that it is a one-time event;
i.e., results from intensive research, modeling, and other
computations or expert opinions are analyzed, the analysis
of potential environmental impacts is prepared, mitigation
measures are identified, and a document is released for pub-
lic review." Unfortunately, this process does not account
for unanticipated changes in environmental conditions, in-
accurate predictions, or subsequent information that might
affect the original environmental protections.26
In short, whether it is a "categorical exclusion" (CE), a full-dress "en-
vironmental impact statement" (EIS), or an "environmental assessment"
and a "finding of no significant impact" (EA/FONSI), every NEPA process
requires a responsible official to assess some given risk, to predict, and to
pursue a course of action in light of the exercise. If we were more serious
about improving our probabilistic thinking about risk, though, these NEPA
documents would become valuable assets upon completion: with them, we
should be able to ground-truth past efforts in prediction, past characteriza-
tions of cause and effect, and to reach some generalizations about NEPA
methods in order to improve our planning and risk-taking.
25. Some data exist, of course. As of March 31, 2010, for example, 157,500 of the approximately
165,600 reported projects and activities carried out pursuant to the American Recovery and Reinvest-
ment Act were finalized on the basis of Categorical Exclusion. See COuNCIL ON ENvTL. QUALITY, THE
Fwr REP. ON THE NAT'L ENVrL. POLICY Acr STATUS & PROGRESS FOR AM. RECOVERY & REIN-
VESTMENT AcT OF 2009 ACTIVITIES & PROJEcrs 4 (2010), http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepalattachments/
may2010/CEQ_- ARRANEPAReportMay_03_2010.pdf. Even beyond the special case of the
ARRA, agencies are supposedly under a duty to document any application of a categorical exclusion,
see, e.g., California v. Norton, 311 F.3d 1162 (9th Cir. 2002), although compliance with such a norm is
obviously difficult to verify.
26. THE NEPA TASK FORCE REP. TO THE COUNCIL ON ENVT. QUALITY: MODERNIZING NEPA
IMPLEMENTATION 44 (2003), http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/ntf/report/finalreport.pdf (quoting COUNCIL ON
ENVTL. QUALITY, THE NAT'L ENvTL. PoLICY AcT: A SmovY oF ITs EFFECTIVENESS AFTER TWENTY-
FIVE YEARS 32 (1997), available at http://ceq.eh.doe.gov/nepa/nepa25fn.pdf) [hereinafter NEPA TASK
FORCE REP.].
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Finally, ever since CEQ's rules have been in place, agencies have been
encouraged to "tier" their NEPA documents in order to "eliminate repeti-
tive discussions of the same issues and to focus on the actual issues ripe for
decision at each level of environmental review."2 7 This notion of tiering
supposedly allows an agency to treat broad-scale environmental risks in a
full-dress environmental impact statement (EIS) for a whole "program"
and then to bracket those broader questions in subsequent stages of imple-
mentation where, presumably, progressively narrower impacts and alterna-
tives can be highlighted.2 8 "When the geographical scope expands,
cumulative effects become more complex, solutions to problems affect mul-
tiple agencies, and information sharing becomes essential,"2 9 though, and
agencies have encountered great difficulties generating NEPA analyses
that organize such risks in a coherent way. "Little formal guidance exists to
distinguish the content requirements of a programmatic analysis and that of
a site-specific analysis." 30  Still, court challenges to the use of "tiering"
rarely end in remands back to the agency for reconsideration of its deci-
sion-making compartments.3 1  Agencies benefit from a healthy measure of
judicial deference in judgments of this kind.32 Tiering makes good sense in
the abstract: environmental risk is abundant and often exists at multiple
levels of consciousness. A formalistic insistence that all imaginable risks be
rehashed at any juncture in which they might factor into a decision would
ignore the perils for practical decision making that such formalism entails.3
In practice, nevertheless, tiering has been a source of confusion and con-
flict-serving as one of the most frequent subjects of CEQ's "guidance"
and other interpretive work 3 4-in large measure because of the difficulties
27. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.20 (2010).
28. See NEPA TASK FORCE REP., supra note 26, at 35-40.
29. Id. at 39.
30. Id. at 40.
31. See, e.g., Fund for Animals v. Kempthorne, 538 F.3d 124, 137-39 (2d Cir. 2008) (upholding
programmatic impact statement on wildlife extermination plan against challenge that site-specific exter-
minations were not going to be assessed individually); N. Alaska Envtl. Ctr. v. Kempthorne, 457 F.3d
969 (9th Cir. 2006) (upholding programmatic impact statement for whole oil and gas leasing program
over challenges that agency's commitment to analyze site-specific actions in the future left risks under-
studied); Minn. Pub. Interest Research Group v. Butz, 498 F.2d 1314 (8th Cir. 1974) (confirming the
general propriety of tiering prior to CEQ's NEPA rules). Rarely is not "never," of course. See, e.g.,
Blue Mountains Biodiversity Project v. Blackwood, 161 F.3d 1208 (9th Cir. 1998) (rejecting agency
judgment that programmatic EIS adequately considered risks of several more specific actions).
32. See MANDELKER, supra note 12, at §§ 9:16-9:17.
33. Tiering can mean both that certain risks will be deferred to some future NEPA analysis and/
or that certain risks have been left to some prior consideration that was presumably broader in scope.
See, e.g., Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390 (1976) (affirming Department of Interior's deferral of
"regional" and site-specific assessments in programmatic EIS for nationwide coal development pro-
gram because no regional or site-specific "proposal" had yet emerged); Manatee County v. Gorsuch,
554 F. Supp. 778 (M.D. Fla. 1982) (upholding EPA decision to forego site-specific NEPA document on
grounds the scenario analyzed in programmatic EIS was precisely like the site-specific proposal for
action under review).
34. See, e g., Jan G. Laitos, Paralysis by Analysis in the Forest Service Oil and Gas Leasing Pro-
gram, 26 LAND & WATER L. REV. 105 (1991); William G. Malley & Angela M. Dusenbury, Tiered
Environmental Studies in the National Environmental Policy Act Process for Highway Projects, 1792
TRANSP. Rus. REc. 101 (2002); J.B. Ruhl & Robert L. Fischman, Adaptive Management in the Courts,
95 MINN. L. REV. 424, 456-61 (2010).
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we all have in disentangling narrow, action-specific risks from the risks en-
tailed in broader courses of conduct.
Besides NEPA's misunderstanding of its own production costs,
though, NEPA also undervalues information that has been gathered, re-
corded, and processed. Once the costs of an adequately "detailed" state-
ment of environmental risks have been born, we should expect the finished
product to be quite valuable. In point of fact, virtually no care is taken to
make these NEPA products widely available, searchable, or otherwise ac-
cessible to prospective users. And EJSs are valued more frequently than
any other NEPA documents!" The countless agency reviews that end with
a CE-which are not necessarily "NEPA documents" under the rules3 6
are rarely even recorded, let alone archived, indexed, or tracked over time.
The thousands of EA/FONSIs that accumulate annually mostly disappear
without a trace. Unfortunately, NEPA itself makes no provision for the
spreading or sharing of its informational benefits. Most completed NEPA
documents, so far as the law is concerned, can recede immediately from
consciousness -with the possible exception of the agency officials for
whom broad-scale NEPA analyses offer a way of expediting yet-to-be com-
pleted NEPA processes. These shortcomings added up to a tragically insuf-
ficient analysis of environmental risk by the Department of Interior as it
moved oil and gas development into deeper and deeper waters. Part II
examines that breakdown.
I. NEPA AT INTERIOR: LEARNING To LEAN
ON THE "UNPREDICTABLE"
If NEPA as it has evolved is being defined by its structural flaws and
our own uneven understanding of the value of information, some agencies
have been able to adapt it to their habits more deftly than others. This part
explores one agency's particularly deft and, in retrospect, tragically negli-
gent risk planning as structured by NEPA. It identifies three key pivots
that arise in NEPA practice routinely: (1) the so-called low-probability/
high-impact risk; (2) the use of tiering to organize risk analysis at broader
and smaller scales; and (3) the incremental nature of information and the
necessity of updating if we are to use our information rationally.
Since September 11, 2001, decision-making theorists-and no small
slice of the public-have been obsessed with optimizing for so-called "low-
probability/high-impact" risks.38 Then-Vice President Cheney even an-
nounced a "1% rule," a rule that truly catastrophic risks should be treated
35. Every EIS must be filed for "review" with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
a step that was added by Section 309 of the Clean Air Act months after NEPA was enacted. See 42
U.S.C. § 7609 (2006); LYNTON KEITH CALDWELL, THE NAT'L ENvrTL. POLIcy Acr: AN AGENDA FOR
THE FUTURE 70-71 (1998). And every completed EIS must be filed with EPA for permanent archiviza-
tion. 40 CEFR. § 1506.9 (2010). No other NEPA documents are archived by EPA.
36. 40 C.F.R. § 1508.10 (2010).
37. See Michael B. Gerrard & Michael Herz, Harnessing Information Technology to Irnprove the
Environmental Irnpact Review Process, 12 N.Y.U. ENVT. L.J. 18 (2003).
38. See, e.g., CASs R. SUNSTEIN, WORST-CASE SCENARIOS (2008).
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"like a certainty."3 9 Cheney's heuristic has a certain sensibility to it de-
pending on one's definition(s) of "catastrophe." Given the former Miner-
als Management Service's NEPA analyses of the risks of catastrophic oil
spills in the deep waters of the Gulf of Mexico, though, this "Cheney doc-
trine" was obviously gerrymandered, to say the least. Who defines the
truly catastrophic such that no expense will be spared in assessing and man-
aging its risks? 40 In our combustion economy, anything necessary to the
extraction, delivery, or use of oil, coal, or natural gas has seemed like a risk
worth taking. Nowhere has this been more evident than at the Department
of the Interior (DOI).
The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) 4 1 and other, related
statutes delegate to DOI the authority to permit exploration for and devel-
opment of oil and gas resources in the coastal areas of the United States
from three to 200 miles offshore.4 2 OCSLA structures DOI's leasing pro-
grams loosely, but NEPA supplies the principal analytical duties that attach
to the many decisions OCSLA requires of DOI.4 3 As OCSLA develop-
ment pressures have intensified and more offshore areas have been opened
to exploration and development, the risks in such activities have become a
commonplace in DOI NEPA processes. And if DOI and its component
bureaus were not the "first movers" on the NEPA technique known as tier-
ing, they were at least fast followers. Since 1986, when DOI established
and delegated its OCLSA responsibilities to the Minerals Management
Service (MMS), MMS categorically excluded from NEPA review (1) appli-
cations for permits to drill (APD); exploration plans (EP); and develop-
ment and production plans (DPP).4 4 Beyond these CEs, though, MMS also
routinely used "programmatic" EISs to discharge NEPA duties over broad
areas of operation.4 5 By 2000, MMS had charted a path of using the NEPA
rules to highlight multiple sources of uncertainty and their resultant unpre-
dictabilities, to advantage its "preferred alternatives" by its interpretation
of OCSLA and carefully selected "purpose and need" statements, 4 6 and
39. SUNSTEIN, supra note 38, at 1.
40. Id. at 6.
41. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (2006).
42. Id. § 1334.
43. See Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer Continental
Shelf Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J. ENERGY NAT. RES. & ENVTL. L. 75,
104-22, 134-36 (1992).
44. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
THE NAT'L ENVTL. POLICY Acr & OUTER CONT'L SHELF OIL & GAS ACTIVITIES 18 (2011) (Staff
Working Paper No. 12), http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/The%20
National%20Environmental%20Policy%20Act%20and%200uter%20Continental%20Shelf%200il%
20and%20Gas%20Activities.pdf.
45. The practice had even divided elements of DOI against each other. See, e.g., Pennaco En-
ergy, Inc. v. Dep't of Interior, 377 F.3d 1147 (10th Cir. 2004) (upholding Interior Board of Land Ap-
peals' reversal of BLM's issuance of oil and gas leases for failure to prepare sufficiently specific NEPA
analyses by relying on tiering from programmatic EISs).
46. The 1973 CEO Guidelines provided that "[a] description of the proposed action" and "a
statement of its purposes" should be included in any EIS. See Council on Environmental Quality,
Preparation of Environmental Impact Statements: Guidelines, 38 Fed. Reg. 20550, 20553 (1973) (codi-
fied at 40 C.F.R. § 1500.3(a)(1)). In the 1978 rules, CEO extracted this concept and clarified it. See
314 [VOL. 30:307
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the production of truly daunting NEPA documents-physically imposing in
their sheer volume-likely to defend against any challenges arising from its
NEPA processes. In short, MMS navigated "ultra deepwater" (greater
than or equal to 5000 feet) drilling in the Gulf of Mexico through NEPA
very skillfully.
In 2000, MMS prepared an Environmental Assessment and FONSI for
"deepwater operations and activities" in the Gulf, anticipating that the
risks of spills and other environmental consequences were increasing.47 It
concluded that, although "[d]eepwater operations have the potential to re-
sult in oil spills on the [outer continental shelf] that are greatly larger than
those previously analyzed," the occurrence of such a spill "is a very low-
probability event" and "the extensive mitigation measures for oil-spill pre-
vention and response currently required are considered adequate to mini-
mize the risk of spills and potential impacts." 4 8 Accounting for all sources,
MMS found in its 2000 FONSI, the frequency was seven blowouts per 1000
well bores-what it called "relatively rare." 49 Unfortunately, that subtle
introduction of the relativity of risk foreshadowed the analytical work-
and analytical failings-to come.
In April 2007, the agency finalized a "programmatic" EIS for "Outer
Continental Shelf" (OCS) drilling operations, stating that the "purpose and
need" behind its fivez-year plan was (1) to "comply" with its enabling legis-
lation, and (2) to "fulfill a need to increase domestic sources of energy."50
At the same time MMS was finalizing another EIS for eleven proposed
Council on Environmental Quality, National Environmental Policy Act: Regulations, 43 Fed. Reg.
55978 (1978). The rules stated that "[t]he statement shall briefly specify the underlying purpose and
need to which the agency is responding in proposing the alternatives including the proposed action."
Id. at 55996 (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 1502.13). This "purpose and need" rule has since proven a power-
ful mechanism for agencies to define the baseline expectations against which their proposed actions-
and, thus, the reasonable alternatives-are to be judged. See, e.g., Colo. Wild, Inc. v. U.S. Forest Serv.,
523 F. Supp. 2d 1213 (D. Colo. 2007); City of Alexandria v. Slater, 198 F.3d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1999).
Thus, while an agency cannot "define its objectives in unreasonably narrow terms," City of Carmel-
by-the-Sea v. U.S. Dept. of Transportation, 123 F.3d 1142, 1155 (9th Cir. 1997), the vast majority of
precedents limit the alternatives that must be considered in an EIS to those that are consistent with the
purpose and need of the project as articulated by the agency. MANDELKER, supra note 12, at § 9-64-65
& n.8.
47. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., GULF OF MEXICO DEEPWATER OPERATIONS & ACTIVITIES
(2000) (MMS 2000-001), http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/7050/gulf-of-mexico-deepwater-
operations-and-activities.pdf [hereinafter DEEPWATER FONSI].
48. DEEPWATER FONSI, supra note 47, at iv-v.
49. Id. at 11-16.
50. Id. at I-1. The Programmatic EIS was done in connection with a plan to sell twenty leases in
seven of the agency's twenty-six outer continental shelf "planning areas." See id. at i. The Interior
Department's enabling legislation, the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act of 1953 (OCSLA), 43 U.S.C.
§§ 1331-1356 (2006), requires that leasing progress according to an orderly plan (but says nothing about
durations). See § 1344(a) ("The Secretary .. . shall prepare and periodically revise, and maintain an oil
and gas leasing program to implement the policies of [OCSLA]."). OCSLA also says the Secretary
"shall select the timing and location of leasing, to the maximum extent practicable, so as to obtain a
proper balance between the potential for environmental damage, the potential for discovery of oil and
gas, and the potential for adverse impact on the coastal zone." § 1344(a)(3). The Secretary, thus,
clearly has discretion to stay ultra-deepwater drilling in the Gulf if the environmental costs are deemed
too high.
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lease sales in the Gulf of Mexico,"' as well as a stand-alone "Oil-Spill Risk
Analysis." 52 Now, we might view the concurrent EISs-one for OCS drill-
ing generally and one for scheduled sales in the Gulf-as proof the
agency's mind was made up about deep water oil development. But it
could also have reflected the agency's awareness of the multi-dimensional-
ity of the trade-offs being considered and the fact that particular sales of
rights to drill in the Gulf presented specific and material risks of "signifi-
cant" environmental impacts wholly apart from the risks being weighed in
the programmatic EIS. Unfortunately, neither of the EISs weighed the
risks of uncontrollable blowouts-which is rather peculiar given the occur-
rence of such blowouts historically.53 For that sort of estimate, the Oil-Spill
Risk Analysis was the only document MMS generated that came even re-
motely close and it limited its large spill arithmetic to events of "[greater
than or equal to]10,000 [barrels]." The Oil-Spill Risk Analysis's large spill
estimate of 10,000 barrels was used to derive spill probabilities "per billion
barrels of production" based on spill-to-production data from 1985 to 1999.
Its finalized predictions suggested 0.05 spills from platforms, 0.34 spills
from pipelines, and 0.25 spills from tankers.54 Using those numbers and
MMS's estimates of expected production in the Gulf, both for the five-year
period 2007 to 2012, and for the life of the leases being sold (2007 to 2046),
the conclusions were stark:
Western Planning Area (2007-12): 9-15% probability
Western Planning Area (2007-46): 92-99.5% probability
Central Planning Area (2007-12): 26-40% probability
Central Planning Area (2007-46): 96-99.5% probability"
The "wealth of historical data and information derived from over fifty
years of oil and gas exploration, development, and production activities
were used extensively by MMS,"5 6 but according to MMS the data were
too coarse to permit any finer-grained analysis of likely spill severity. In
short, the agency found that spill volumes are unpredictable and stopped
short even from hypothesizing some plausible upper bound limit on a cata-
strophic spill.
51. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., GULF OF MEXICO OCS REGION, GULF OF MEXICO OCS LEASE
SALES: 2007-2012, FINAL ENvrL. IMPAcr STATEMENT (MMS 2007-18), http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/
PDFs/2007/2007-018-Voll.pdf [hereinafter GULF SALEs EIS].
52. See MINERALS MGMT. SERV., OIL-SPILL RISK ANALYSIS: GULF OF MEXICO OUTER CONT'L
SHELF (OCS) LEASE SALES, CENT. PLANNING AREA & W. PLANNING AREA, 2007-2012, & GULFWIDE
OCS PROGRAM, 2007-2046 at 1 (OCS Report MMS 2007-040), http://www.boemre.gov/ITD/pubs/2007/
2007-040.pdf [hereinafter OIL-SPILL RISK ANALYSIS].
53. The best data available-gathered by a Norwegian firm that specializes in oil and gas devel-
opment risk assessment-counted some 573 blowouts worldwide since 1955. See Arne Jerneldv, How
to Defend Against Future Oil Spills, 466 NATURE 182, 183 (2010) (describing SINTEF database). That
yields an average occurrence of about one per month. Note, though, that this data set-by far the most
salient information in MMS's risk assessments regarding deepwater exploration and development-was
(and is) privately owned and, therefore, of limited accessibility.
54. See OIL-SPILL RISK ANALYSIS, supra note 52, at 11.
55. See id. at 52 (Table Ib).
56. See id. at 4.
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Of course, the then-worst well blowout by volume ever recorded was
the IXTOC-1 in 1979-a well operated by Pemex in the Gulf of Mexico.
What was MMS's analysis of that spill and its likelihood of repeating given
the conditions so obviously specific to deepwater development in the Gulf
of Mexico? It was never even mentioned. Yet, in its Sales EIS, MMS pur-
ported to construct a massive tradeoff between a certain inevitability/un-
predictability of oil spills and the expected prosperity oil development
would bring. The tradeoff was built on critical assumptions derived from
past loss occurrences in U.S. waters and other select information. MMS's
estimates were for between 155 to 221 development wells in the "western"
and between 330 to 468 development wells in its "central" Gulf planning
areas.? To an agency as keyed to revenue as the former MMS was,
5 8 these
numbers were surely impressive. MMS also estimated-buried in an Ap-
pendix to its 1000-plus page document-that, in the forty-year life cycle of
the leases then being proposed, there would be between 232 to 272 blow-
outs amidst the thousands of wellbores completed. 9 Matching the central
estimates from the Western and Central planning areas combined (188 and
399 wells, respectively), that amounts to an expected blowout for every 2.33
"development" wells being proposed in 2007. How could any rational ac-
tor have preferred that future-that many events of any real severity would
toxify the whole Gulf. The answer, of course, is that MMS assumed a com-
paratively tiny volume of oil escaping in each event: the upper bound
"large spill" estimate MMS gave its modeling consultants was between
1000 and 5300 barrels-between 42,000 and 222,600 gallons.6
0 And that
risk is much easier to ignore in an omnibus risk assessment. It seems like a
chance worth taking.
MMS's spill volume range came from its dubious assumption that all
past spill events reported to the U.S. Coast Guard were the best guide to
possible future blowouts in the Gulf of Mexico. This assumption was made
notwithstanding the fact that the future operations in the Gulf would be
heavily concentrated in deep water and notwithstanding the fact that all
past spill events had nothing to do with "subsalt" drilling to unprecedented
57. GULF SALES EIS, supra note 51, at 4-13. A "development" well is a well that is actually
capable of producing hydrocarbons for market. Each development well may have several "explora-
tory" wellbores behind it. Id. at 4-9. This yielded a combined projection of about 500 to 700 wells,
2007-2046 (i.e., during the forty-year planning period adopted based on the average operating lives of
the wells). Id. Based on historic data and some modeling, MMS estimated between 28.5 and 32.5
billion barrels of oil and between 142.3 and 162.7 trillion cubic feet of natural gas could be produced
from the eleven lease sales it was proposing. Id. at 4-5.
58. See NAT'L COMM'N ON THE BP DEEPWATER HORIZON OIL SPILL & OFFSHORE DRILLING,
DEEPWATER: THE GULF OIL DISASTER & THE FUTURE OF OFFSHORE DRILLING 57-67 (2011),
http://www.oilspillcommission.gov/sites/default/files/documents/DEEPWATER-ReporttothePresident-
FINAL.pdf [hereinafter NAT'L COMM'N REP.] (describing MMS as a "cross purposes" regulator be-
cause it was tasked with maximizing revenue and supply while also being tasked with the creation and
enforcement of environmental and safety standards).
59. GULF SALES EIS, supra note 51, at Table 4-4, http://www.gomnr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2
0 0 7 /2 0 0 7 -
018-Vol2.pdf.
60. PROGRAMMATIC EIS, supra note 4, at IV-29, http://www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-2O1
2 FEIS/
Ghapter4A-BlrmpactsProposedAction.pdf. The Macondo well, in fact, released much more than the
upper bound spill estimates in the EIS's and the Oil Spill Risk Analysis every day for 91 days.
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depths.6 ' Salt is the dominant structural element in the Gulf of Mexico's
hydrocarbon plays, but explorers had long assumed that major reserves did
not exist beneath the salt. Conventional seismic techniques were powerless
to prove otherwise. Yet, by the 1990s, the assumption was dashed as better
geology, better seismic testing, and several discoveries changed the conven-
tional wisdom.6 2 None of this changed the extremities of the environment,
of course: temperature and pressure extremes dictate significant changes in
most operating assumptions, as does a drill string tip that is hours away
from its controller. 63
Finer discrimination of the risks MMS confronted as it was considering
ultra-deepwater drilling in the Gulf was possible, but it would not, admit-
tedly, have been easy. Data on deep water blowouts and blowout frequen-
cies were, in some sense, available.6 4  A healthier respect for the risks
endemic to subsalt prospecting in the Gulf may have led MMS in search of
that information. Whether all of this information was readily available, of
course, is something else altogether. NEPA has never been clarified
enough to establish just how "available" information must be before it
should be factored into NEPA documents like MMS's. 6 5 If we are to im-
prove our understanding of risks by way of NEPA processes, we must up-
date our information management ideals themselves and that means more
clarity on what information should be deemed "available."
61. As a report from the Congressional Research Service concluded in 2008, the decline in total
incidents and volumes of oil spills in U.S. waters that began in 1991 is probably "attributable to the
decline in volume spilled by oil tankers and barges-the vessels that transport oil and have historically
spilled the most oil." CONG. RESEARCH SERV., CRS REP. FOR CONGRESS: OIL SPILLS IN U.S. COASTAL
WATERS: BACKGROUND, GOVERNANCE, & ISSUES FOR CONGRESS CRS-4 (Sept. 2008 update). This
trend, of course, had nothing necessarily to do with blowout risks. Just as importantly, too, the spike of
both spill incidents and volumes in 2005-attributed to Hurricanes Rita and Katrina-also should have
been part of MMS's baseline data.
62. See NAT'L COMM'N REP., supra note 58, at 42.
63. See id. at 51-52 (describing the need for stronger materials, contingency plans for hydrate
formation, pressure loss, viscosity variabilities, etc.); id. at 99-103 (describing the challenge of operating
thousands of feet below the surface where an apparatus can take one hour per thousand feet to
descend).
64. Blowouts in the Gulf are not uncommon in any absolute sense, and information about them
is relatively abundant. The 1979 IXTOC disaster spilled betweenl40 and 148 million gallons before it
was brought under control. And other blowouts in the Gulf have occurred, but have been much more
manageable-likely because of the depth of water in which they occurred.
65. The current (amended) rule requires that
If the information relevant to reasonably foreseeable significant adverse impacts cannot be
obtained because the overall costs of obtaining it are exorbitant or the means to obtain it are
not known, the agency shall include within the environmental impact statement:
(1) A statement that such information is incomplete or unavailable; (2) a statement of the
relevance of the incomplete or unavailable information to evaluating reasonably foreseeable
significant adverse impacts on the human environment; (3) a summary of existing credible
scientific evidence which is relevant to evaluating the reasonably foreseeable significant ad-
verse impacts on the human environment, and (4) the agency's evaluation of such impacts
based upon theoretical approaches or research methods generally accepted in the scientific
community. For the purposes of this section, "reasonably foreseeable" includes irnpacts which
have catastrophic consequences, even if their probability of occurrence is low, provided that the
analysis of the irnpacts is supported by credible scientific evidence, is not based on pure conjec-
ture, and is within the rule of reason.
318
OIL SPILL RISKS BEYOND THE HORIZON
At least since the philosopher David Hume wrote, we have known
that "there is no justification for regarding what has been observed to hap-
pen in the past as any sort of reliable guide to the future."
6 6 We have
known, that is, that there are no logical foundations in inductive reason-
ing-reasoning from something specific to something general or from
something in the past to something in the future. The real puzzle has been
the practice of science: our scientific knowledge vastly exceeds its observa-
tional bases, leading the philosopher C.D. Broad to have once called induc-
tion "the glory of science and the scandal of philosophy." 67 Because of our
sciences' successes in prediction, we generally (happily) trade logical valid-
ity for reliability and predictive accuracy-for probability. It is highly
probable that the force of gravity will continue to work later today, but it is
not logically proven either from a lifetime of observations, Newtonian
mechanics, or the general theory of relativity. Because probabilities are
unknowable without information (often lots of it), our practical trouble is
that, for too many real-time decisions, we lack critically important informa-
tion-and rushed efforts to gather it can be a waste, or worse. Conse-
quently, our probabilistic reasoning is often deeply flawed, and it is usually
never more so than when we must make predictions about other humans'
behaviors.68
Nevertheless, if, as Hume argued, similarity is the key to successful
prediction, MMS should have had a much more discriminating account of
the relevantly similar parts of our recorded past for it to have had any
pretensions at all about having assessed the probable environmental im-
pacts of its deepwater drilling plans.6 9 As the sociologist Charles Perrow
argued in his classic Normal Accidents, the coupling of complex technologi-
cal systems can actually increase their risk of failure precisely because of
those systems' interactivities and the possibilities of cascading (or "com-
mon mode") failures therein.7 0 Perrow's tight coupling and the characteris-
tic risks of bundling complex systems that are susceptible to "common
mode" failures is one avenue that MMS probably should have pursued fur-
ther in its NEPA analyses. The limitations of Perrow's thesis, of course, are
40 C.F.R. § 1502.22(b) (2010) (emphasis added). "The amended regulation thus 'retains the duty to
describe the consequences of a remote, but potentially severe impact, but grounds the duty in evalua-
tion of scientific opinion rather than in the framework of a conjectural "worst case analysis." '" Rob-
ertson v. Methow Valley Citizens Council, 490 U.S. 332, 354-55 (1989) (quoting 50 Fed. Reg. 32237
(1985)). No effort has ever been mounted to define "exorbitant" information costs.
66. CoLIN HowsoN, HUME'S PROBLEM: INDUCTION & THE JUSTIFICATION OF BELIEF 1 (2000).
67. HowsoN, supra note 66, at 10 (quoting C.D. Broad, The Philosophy of Francis Bacon, in
ETHICS & THE HISTORY OF PHILOSOPHY 143 (1952)).
68. See PHILIP E. TETLOCK, EXPERT POLITICAL JUDGMENT (2005) (showing that regression-
based algorithms outperform putative experts in predicting human decision making without exception).
69. Gilboa and colleagues, for example, have suggested a way of improving frequentist probabili-
ties by a process of what they call similarity weighted frequency estimates wherein more similar cases
get higher weights in the computation of frequencies. See Itzhak Gilboa et al., On the Definition of
Objective Probabilities by Empirical Similarity, 172 SYNTHESE 79 (2009).
70. CHARLEs PERROw, NORMAL ACCIDENTS: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHs. 62-100 (1984).
Bhopal, Chernobyl, and the Challenger explosion arguably further confirmed his thesis. See CHARLES
PERROW, NORMAL ACCIDENTs: LIVING WITH HIGH-RISK TECHs. 353 (2d ed. 1999).
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that it does not specify the various "modes" of complex systems ex ante.
But the use of two broad-scale EISs wherein specific drilling locations-
with specific geologic formations, known water depths, and particular oper-
ating equipment-were undefined, only to be later used to "tier" out of
view the more concrete spill risks in subsequent EA/FONSIs and CEs,n'
was not so much a failure to imagine some given cascade of failures as it
was a denial of their possibility.
Ironically, an enabling statute itself mandated that DOI assess the "cu-
mulative" effects of its OCS lands mineral leasing and that it report the
results to Congress every three years.72 With all the power granted to it-
the discretionary factoring that its enabling legislation vested in the De-
partment of Interior-came at least the responsibility to fulfill a specific
statutory duty to assess the probable environmental consequences of deep-
water drilling as a course of conduct. To our great misfortune, though,
DOI proved incapable of distinguishing between risks it had assessed and
those it had not when it continued to categorically exclude particular drill-
ing operations.
To be clear, every NEPA document MMS generated highlighted
"spills" as the singularly threatening environmental possibility of more de-
velopment. But none of the decision documents isolated the possible fu-
tures in which a giant spill-an uncontrollable blowout of massive
proportions-might occur. Indeed, MMS proudly announced in May 2008
that some seventy percent of the Gulf's oil and gas were then coming from
deep waters and that "[c]ontinued advancement into th[e] deepwater fron-
tier is important to our Nation's energy security."" MMS had long held
that the risk of offshore spills should be assessed as a function of the
71. In its post mortem "Report Regarding the Minerals Management Service's National Envi-
ronmental Policy Act Policies, Practices, and Procedures as They Relate to Outer Continental Shelf Oil
and Gas Exploration and Development (Aug. 16, 2010), see COUNCIL ON ENVrTL. QUALITY, REVIEW OF
MMS NEPA POLICIES, PRACTICES, & PROCEDURES OCS OIL & GAS EXPLORATION & DEV., 75 Fed.
Reg. 29996 (2010), CEQ found that MMS had "relied on tiering from [its programmatic] EISs and
provided no additional details or analysis in the Lease Sale 206 [EA]" and that the CERs completed in
connection with particular permissions to drill raised virtually nothing to MMS's attention. Id. at 24-25.
72. OCSLA § 18, codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1346 (2010), was amended in 1978 to require the Inte-
rior Department to assess "the cumulative effect of activities conducted" on "the human, marine, and
coastal environments" and to periodically report its results to Congress. See Pub. L. No. 95-372, 92
Stat. 649-653 (codified at 43 U.S.C. § 1346(e) (2010)). This duty was, ironically, cancelled in 2000, just
as deepwater development in the Gulf was accelerating. See Pub. L. No. 104-66, § 3003 (2000) (repeal-
ing any provision of law requiring submittal to Congress of any regular periodic report listed in House
Document 103-7 (2000), including the reports required by § 1346(e)).
73. See Press Release, Minerals Mgmt. Serv., Advances in Oil & Gas Leasing, Drilling & Prod.
Continue in Deepwater Gulf of Mexico (May 5, 2008), available at http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/
whatsnew/newsreal/2008/080505.pdf. This press release was based on an MMS report. See MINERALS
MoGMT. SERV., DEEPWATER GUte oF MEXICO 2008: AMERICA'S OFFSHORE ENERGY FUTURE (2008)
(MMS 2008-013), http://www.gomr.boemre.gov/PDFs/2008/2008-013.pdf [hereinafter DEEPWATER
GUte oF MEXICO 2008] (detailing the dramatic expansion of deepwater development throughout the
Gulf). By 2007, MMS noted, a record fifteen rigs were drilling for oil and gas in 5,000 feet of water or
more throughout the Gulf, and thirteen more rigs were on order. Id. at 9.
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volumes of oil handled. 4 And yet, according to MMS, "[o]ffshore leasing
and development has been occurring in the Gulf of Mexico for over [fifty]
years. The predictable patterns of activity that have become established
there were used to estimate future activity."" No NEPA document even
mentioned the sub-seafloor troubles for which the Gulf is famous among
operators: extremely pressurized oil and gas reservoirs in geologically
"young," unsettled, and fragile formations of salt, sand, and shale.
7 6 Note,
finally, that these particular misjudgments went unnoticed by the plaintiffs
in two lawsuits brought against MMS's Gulf OCS development plans.7
7
Just as striking, though, is how MMS never really recognized the vol-
ume of deepwater drilling and well boring as a unique, unprecedented
risk.7 In 2000+ pages of "detailed statements," 7 9 in fact, MMS never once
mentioned a possible event like BP's Macondo disaster, let alone at-
tempted to quantify its probability. Indeed, at the programmatic stage-
where the issue had not yet been "scoped" out of existence 80-aggregate
74. See Cheryl McMahon Anderson & Robert P. LaBelle, Comparative Occurrence Rates for
Offshore Oil Spills, 1(2) SPILL Sci. & TECH. BULL. 131, 131-33 (1994) (proposing a "simple approach
for estimating oil spill occurrence, normalized as a function of the volume of oil handled").
75. PROGRAMMATIC EIS, supra note 4, at IV-26, http://www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-201
2 FEIS/
Chapter4A-BImpactsProposedAction.pdf. MMS even made the express assumption "that [seventy-
five] percent of all the activity listed in [the proposed action] will occur in deepwater areas of the Gulf
(defined as 1,000 feet or deeper) and [twenty-five] percent will occur in shallower water depths." Id.
76. See Kevin Spear, Documents Show BP Chose a Less-Expensive, Less-Reliable Method for
Completing Well in Gulf Oil Spill, ORLANDO SEN T., May 23, 2010, http://articles.orlandosentinel.com/
2010-05-23/news/os-florida-oil-spill-unspoken-risks-201005
2 2 -1oil-company-bp-rig-oil-spill.
77. In a lawsuit challenging Lease Sale 200 in 2006, the State of Louisiana challenged several
deficiencies in the EA/FONSL prepared by MMS. In none of Louisiana's submissions (either in its
administrative challenge or in its lawsuit) did the state complain about insufficient attention to deepwa-
ter drilling's risks per se. See generally Ryan M. Seidemann & James G. Wilkins, Blanco v. Burton:
What Did We Learn from Louisiana's Recent OCS Challenge?, 25 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 393 (2008). In
2007, the Center for Biological Diversity challenged the five-year plan for OCS operations, alleging
several deficiencies in the NEPA process relating to the Beaufort, Bering, and Chukchi seas, and none
of its complaints were aimed at insufficient analysis of deepwater drilling's risks per se. See Ctr. for
Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 563 F.3d 466 (D.C. Cir. 2009).
78. Strictly speaking, the P of a catastrophic blowout like BP's is nonadditive from well to well,
lease to lease. To assume otherwise is either a "Gambler's fallacy" (so named for the tendency of
gamblers to bet on red after a long run of black) or a judgment from specific information about well
drilling in the field and, therefore, not a P expression at all. JONATHAN BARON, THINKING & DECIDING
152-53 (1998). Still, consideration of the total population of "trials" where a risk is born will necessarily
yield an aggregate or cumulative P of the named event(s).
79. EISs are often denounced as being "overstuffed" either in preparation for litigation or, as is
sometimes alleged, as a way of burying the small minority of information within the document that
would have the greatest public salience. See Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA, supra note 16, at
918-25.
80. By "tiering" its NEPA documents from (1) an OCS-wide programmatic EIS, to (2) a multi-
sale EIS, to (3) a lease-sale EA/FONSI, to (4) a well-specific categorical exclusion, MMS was able to
progressively narrow the spill risks under consideration such that a Gulf-wide risk assessment could
only have been pertinent at the initial stages-years ahead of the actual drilling. See Council on Envi-
ronmental Quality, Review of MMS NEPA Policies, Practices, and Procedures for OCS Oil and Gas
Exploration and Development, 75 Fed. Reg. 29996, 29997 (Aug. 16, 2010). By the time a well is actually
sunk, in short, "scoping" allows for analyses that "meet the needs of the project," wherein "less tangible
and secondary environmental effects are usually ignored, and opportunities for public involvement are
minimal." Tim Snell & Richard Cowell, Scoping in Environmental Impact Assessment: Balancing Pre-
caution and Efficiency?, 26 ENVT. IMP. Ass. REV. 359, 373 (2006).
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risks of the sort ought to have at least entered the calculus somehow.81
When MMS completed the Environmental Assessment (EA) and FONSI
for Lease Sale 206 (the lease sale that would eventually include BP's
Macondo well) in October 2007,82 the high-profile focus was hurricane risk.
The well known "availability bias"83 was likely at work here: nerves were
still raw from Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the prospect of worsening
hurricanes loomed (and still looms). 84 Hurricane risk is a proper focus of
some attention.8 Paying no attention at all to a seafloor blowout in "ultra-
deep" water-which the MMS official in charge of its NEPA processes ad-
mitted after the fact86 -turned out to be an extremely costly error, though.
Throughout its existence, MMS consistently calculated the probability
and severity of possible spills based on past spill occurrence frequencies
and the projected production rates in its plans. Throughout, the agency's
mantra remained that "the potential consequences of an oil spill depend on
many variable circumstances that are unpredictable."" But what federal
agency imaginable could have had better, more complete information
available to it for deriving a more discriminating assessment of the proba-
ble consequences of its actions than the MMS of 2007-09? MMS was
deeply and consistently partnered with the firms operating on its permis-
sions. MMS boasted in 2008 that it had been partnering with major opera-
tors to improve the technology for recovering hydrocarbons at great
depths. Yet, while "the technologies for drilling have advanced rapidly in
81. As MMS noted, its "estimated number of large spills that could occur is a function of the
[overall] oil-resource estimate. Therefore, the impacts could be greater to some environmental re-
sources because they could be exposed to more large spills than other environmental resources."
PROGRAMMATIC EIS, supra note 4, at I-10, http://www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-2012FEIS/Intro.pdf. In
short, the more aggregate production is projected, the greater the aggregate probability of a "large
spill."
82. Lease Sale 206 offered over 5500 tracts comprising some 29.8 million acres in areas between
three and 230 miles off the coasts of Louisiana, Mississippi, and Alabama. Some tracts were in as much
as 11,200 feet of water. Over 1,000 bids from eighty-five companies were received on 615 tracts, a third
of which were in "ultra" deepwater. See David Paganie, OCS Lease Sale Sets Record; Revenue Sharing
to Begin, OFFSHORE, Apr. 1, 2008, at 3.
83. Long noted by those who view the public as disoriented and distracted by current events,"availability cascades," the propensity of news stories-whatever their actual relevance-to dominate
people's attention, were the focus of Cass R. Sunstein & Timur Kuran, Availability Cascades and Risk
Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 683 (1999).
84. In Louisiana's lawsuit challenging Lease Sale 200, MMS reliance on the baseline hurricane
risk estimates took center stage in the state's NEPA claims. See Seidemann & Wilkins, supra note 77, at
400-15.
85. The first rig Transocean leased to BP for the Macondo prospect, the Marianas, had to sus-
pend drilling in October 2009 after it was damaged by Hurricane Ida. The Deepwater Horizon rig
resumed drilling in February 2010, missing the hurricane season but encountering many troubles in the
well bore. See Spear, supra note 76 (describing several mishaps and other incidents aboard Deepwater
Horizon throughout its drilling operation).
86. See Steven Mufson & Michael D. Shear, Pressure Grows for Action by BP, WASH. PosT, May
1, 2010, at Al ("Hammond Eve, who did [NEPA compliance on OCS drilling for MMS] said [MMS]
never planned for response to an oil spill of this size. 'We never imagined that it would happen because
the safety measures were supposed to work and prevent it from happening,' he said.").
pf87. PROGRAMMATIC ETS, supra note 4, at ii, http://www.boemre.gov/5-year/2007-2012FEISIntro.
88. See DEEPWATER Guu? oF MEXICO 2008, supra note 73, at 42-43.
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recent decades, spill response efforts have not. People are using the same
booms, dispersants[,] and oil herders as they did for [IXTOC]." 8 9 And still
no such updated probability specific to deepwater drilling in the Gulf was
even attempted. If anything, MMS's sham frequentist reasoning only fur-
ther emboldened those who were taking the risks, protecting them in a
cocoon of "unpredictability" and supposed rationality in the face thereof.
Given its overall mission, perhaps, it is little wonder that MMS never
stopped to weigh-let alone seek to mitigate-"the heightened risks associ-
ated with the use of floating rigs and platforms" (which are necessary in
deep water) or to dwell on the fact that, in the event of a blowout, "deep-
water wells can be very productive and have flow potentials that can be
[five] to [ten] times higher than shallow water wells." 90 It is little wonder,
perhaps, that MMS never perceived a qualitative break between the "spills
that have occurred" 9' in our recent past and the spills that were possible-
perhaps even probable-in the scale of operations it planned for the Gulf's
deep waters.9 2 Even in the programmatic EIS-the one NEPA document
broad enough in scope to approach deep water oil and gas development in
U.S. waters as a course of actions-MMS remained steadfastly focused on
the localized side-effects of drilling, rig operations, fuel transport, and ge-
neric spill frequencies. 93 Throughout that document and others MMS in-
toned that the "magnitude" of spill impacts would "depend upon the
location, timing, and volume of the spills"9 4 and that all of it was essentially
unpredictable. MMS, in short, treated NEPA like a project obstruction.
89. Jernel6v, supra note 53, at 183.
90. See SEC'Y OF THE INTERIOR, DECISION MEM. REGARDING THE SUSPENSION OF CERTAIN
OFFSHORE PERMITTING & DRILLING AcTIvITIES ON THE OUTER CONT'L SHELF 9 (2010), http://www.
doi.gov/deepwaterhorizon/upload/Salazar-Bromwich-July-12-Final.pdf [hereinafter DEP'T OF INTERIOR
SUSPENSION DECISION]. Again, what were analyzed in depth were the locational impacts of rigs, drill-
ing, and production facilities. See GULF SALES EIS, supra note 51, at 4-10 to 4-70 (reviewing the likely
environmental impacts from bottom area disturbance, sediment displacement, anchoring, space-use
conflicts, aesthetic interference, bottom debris, workovers and abandonments and the disposal of drill-
ing muds, cuttings and produced waters, deck drainage, vessel wastes, air emissions, etc.). What was
not analyzed: strategic alternatives to deep water development before its time. Id.
91. GULF SALES EIS, supra note 51, at 4-71.
92. Indeed, the Gulf Sales EIS seems almost calculating in its use of certain trend lines and date
ranges that bear little connection to the actions under consideration. MMS even specially bulleted a
dozen (statistically gerrymandered) points, including the following: (1) the volume of reported spill
incidents in U.S. waters ha[d] been trending downward since 1973; (2) there had been no spills reported
of over 1 million gallons since 1991; (3) the majority of reported spills since 1973 involved discharges of
between 1 and 100 gallons; (4) almost 75% of all reported spills from 1973-2004 occurred within 3
nautical miles of shore and almost 84% of the volume of all reported spills occurred within 3 nautical
miles, (5) vessels accounted for the majority of spills by volume. GULF SALES EIS, supra note 51, at 4-
71 to 4-72. Had MMS stopped to note that spill volumes and frequencies had been declining in recent
decades because of the enhancement of vessel precautions and the corresponding improvements in
vessel safety, see, the agency might have stopped to consider that its data were not the relevant popula-
tion of events from which to draw its P estimates.
93. Decision researchers characterize this kind of defect in MMS decision-making variously as
"conservatism," "confirmation bias," incrementalism, "interstitial escalation of commitment," cognitive
inertia, etc. See George Wright & Paul Goodwin, Future-Focused Thinking: Combining Scenario Plan-
nling with Decision Analysis, 8 J. MULTI-GRrr. DECIs. ANAL. 311 (1999).
94. See, e.g., PROGRAMMATIC EIS, supra note 4, at II-4 to II-13, http:Ilwww.boemre.govl5-yearl
2007-2012FEIS/Chapter2Alternatives.pdf.
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More importantly, though, MMS's bi-modal distribution of its "small"
versus "large" spills based on historic frequencies of all spills is indicative
of just how simplistic federal agencies' thinking about risk and prediction
has become in gargantuan NEPA processes like those MMS conducted.
The available information on deep well boring risks, blow-out preventer
valves (BPVs), ultradeep "wildcat" well control technologies-even the in-
formation on U.S. spill response capabilities-was far superior to anything
included in the (overstuffed) ELSs or EA/FONSI. What MMS pulled to-
gether in its documents was rather more like a kind of telescoping boiler-
plate: a measured serving of whatever was ready to hand without regard for
need or propriety. Well control is especially difficult in unsettled geologic
formations.9 5 BPVs have long had a disturbingly high failure rate.9 6 And
spills originating from deepwater blowouts are known to have erratic "sur-
face signatures" which severely complicate their cleanup.97 The technology
for bringing blowouts under control at extreme depths has not improved
much in decades. 98 MMS had access to all of this information and, yet, did
nothing to separate out a specific risk it was then confronting: the risk of an
uncontrollable blowout at extreme depths in the salty, sandy bottoms of the
Gulf. Of course, in retrospect, it is always easier to see what one had no
real reason to believe. 99 But the fact that none of the planning documents
even made an issue of the augmented and unique risk associated with ex-
treme-depth operations-or how technically challenging the loss of well
control would become at such depths-speaks volumes to how NEPA is
serving us today.1 00 We agonize over the potential "cumulative effects" of
95. See DEEPWATER FONSI, supra note 47, at 111-7.
96. BPVs are actually many well control mechanisms rolled into one, the last resort of which are
known as "blind shear rams" because, if triggered, they are designed to shear the well pipe hydrauli-
cally and seal a well on itself. David Barstow et al., Regulators Failed to Address Risks in Oil Rig Fail-
Safe Device, N.Y. TiMEs, June 20, 2010, at B21. In 2009, Transocean-the world's largest offshore rig
owner and operator-commissioned a "strictly confidential" study of BPVs and, specifically, of blind
shear rams' effectiveness. Id. By focusing on eleven cases where crews on deepwater rigs lost control
of their wells and tried to activate their BPV, Transocean's study found that the well was brought under
control in only six of those cases-for a failure rate of forty-five percent. Id. MMS may have had no
(direct) access to that information in preparing its EIS's in 2007. But it presumably did have access to
two studies, one in 2002 and one in 2004, concluding that enhancements in well pipe strength had made
blind shear rams far less effective today than they had been when designed; MMS was one of the
funders of those studies. See id.
97. DEEPWATER FONSI, supra note 47, at 11-57 to 11-60. The Department of Interior also
found-after the Macondo well blowout-that the process of "cementing" a deepwater well (backfilling
the void created with structural cement) is more complicated at extreme depths and therefore riskier.
See DEP'T OF INTERIOR SUSPENSION DECISION, supra note 90, at 9-10.
98. Jernel6v, supra note 53, at 183.
99. Cf DEP'T OF INTERIOR SUSPENSION DECISION, supra note 90, at 8 (highlighting the risks of
seafloor BPV's and that "performance problems" have been identified on other deepwater BPV's since
the Macondo well blowout).
100. MMS literally argued that "[d]espite an increased number of new sources for potential spills,
as well as the possibility of much larger spills, one should not conclude that there is an increased risk of
environmental impact from spills in deep water." DEEPWATER FONSI, supra note 47, at 11-57 (emphasis
added). The reasoning behind this was frequentist (if flawed): most spills that had occurred in the past
occurred in shallow waters and were caused by threats to and failings of shallow water technology. See
id. at II-58 to II-59.
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oil development as it will exacerbate anthropogenic climate changeo but
pay almost no attention at all to how our agencies might use NEPA as a
tool for improving overall agency competence.
III. IMPROVING NEPA AND OURSELVES: LoW-PROBABILITY RISKS,
RULES, AND EXPERT JUDGMENT
CEQ's NEPA rules originally required a "worst case scenario" analysis
in an EIS.10 2 Convinced that "worst case scenario" (WCS) analysis had
become distracting and unhelpful, the CEQ repealed the WCS rules in
1986.103 But NEPA's principals never imagined anything better when they
rescinded the duty to conjure up a WCS. Instead, NEPA's agents now fol-
low formulii to get on to some next project, never looking back to learn
from the accumulated record of their own incompetence. Even our current
director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs displayed a
striking ignorance about NEPA's actual practice history where "worst-case
scenarios" were concerned when he waded into the subject in 2008.104
Some have argued that had MMS faced a WCS requirement in its Gulf
Sales EIS, the possibility of a catastrophic blowout like the BP Macondo
101. See, e.g., Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Interior, 563 F.3d 466, 453-58 (D.C.
Cir. 2009). CEQ's rules categorize the ramifications of a subject action variously as "direct effects,"
"indirect effects," "impacts," "cumulative impacts," and "consequences." See 40 C.F.R. §§ 1502.16
(2008), 1508.8 (2009). While the rules often use these terms interchangeably, there is a qualitative
difference that separates "cumulative effects"-ramifications that may cascade from the subject action
or a course of similar actions-from other kinds of "impacts," in the completion of an EIS.
Cumulative effects are easily the most complex dimension of the "NEPA process." Cf. 40 C.F.R.
§ 1508.7 (defining cumulative impact as "the impact on the environment which results from the incre-
mental impact of the action when added to other past, present, and reasonably foreseeable future ac-
tions regardless of what agency (Federal or non-Federal) or person undertakes such other actions");
COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, CONSIDERING CUMULATIVE EFFECTS UNDER THE NAT'L ENVTL. POL-
icy AcT v (1997), http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepa/exec.pdf ("Analyzing cumulative effects is more
challenging, primarily because of the difficulty of defining the geographic (spatial) and time (temporal)
boundaries."). Yet they may be the least well understood. Id. at 1, http://ceq.hss.doe.gov/nepa/ccenepal
secl.pdf ("Evidence is increasing that the most devastating environmental effects may result not from
the direct effects of a particular action, but from the combination of individually minor effects of multi-
ple actions over time."); see Save the Yaak Comm. v. Block, 840 F.2d 714, 722 (9th Cir. 1988) (invalidat-
ing Environmental Assessment for failure to consider adequately the reasonably foreseeable
cumulative impacts of the decision).
102. See Council on Environmental Quality, National Environmental Policy Act: Regulations, 43
Fed. Reg. 55978, 55997 (1978) (promulgating 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22). Prior to CEQ's issuance of the rules
in 1978, a collection of court cases had yielded a long menu of directives to agencies confronting uncer-
tainty, each with its own verbal formulation with important, if subtle, differences from the next. See
Carla Mattix & Kathleen Becker, Scientific Uncertainty Under the National Environmental Policy Act,
54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1125, 1128-32 (2002). CEQ's rules replaced, in Mattix and Becker's words, a "mo-
rass" of conflicting judge-made standards. Id. at 1131.
103. The WCS requirement had been a favorite of action-agency opponents. See Edward A. Fitz-
gerald, The Rise and Fall of Worst Case Analysis, 18 U. DAYTON L. REV. 1 (1992). The WCS require-
ment was eventually repealed in full, but only after the 1984 presidential election. See Council on
Environmental Quality, National Environmental Policy Act Regulations; Incomplete or Unavailable
Information, 51 Fed. Reg. 15618 (1986). CEQ had issued proposed guidance on the matter in early
1983. Id. at 15619.
104. In Sunstein's discussion of NEPA and "worst case scenarios" in 2008, he never mentioned
NEPA's erstwhile requirement that agencies confronting choices with incomplete information produce
a "worst case scenario" analysis; never mentioned its elimination in 1986; and never mentioned the
supposedly probability-driven doctrines the courts later developed. See SUNSTEIN, supra note 38, at
3252011]1
MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW
disaster would have entered its calculus, and perhaps would have shaken
MMS out of its "willful blindness." 05 I am not so sure.
To progress, NEPA and its agents need clearer thinking about what we
might call "desired future conditions" and about creating the kind of cogni-
tive and organizational partnerships needed for truly systemic risk plan-
ning. NEPA, like so many of the statutes that have emulated it, has
become a project obstruction device in large part because our legal system
encourages its agents to ignore the statute's "planning and integration" re-
quirement.' 06 So what practical steps toward the truly systemic risk plan-
ning could justify our continued recourses to federal law and centralized
bureaucracies like DOI? These tools, after all, are famous for "absorbing"
uncertainty, masking it, and making it seem manageable.107 This part
sketches three such steps: (1) the strategic use of NEPA's three different
tracks to incentivize the relevant parties to gather, generate, or release in-
formation necessary to rational risk assessments by agencies like DOI; (2)
the use of updated probability techniques in place of generic and largely
uninformative "frequentist" statistical reasoning; and (3) the CEQ's
amendment of the NEPA rules to require scenario planning whenever pre-
dictive uncertainties lead the preparers of a programmatic EIS to admit
that subsequent NEPA documents will be necessary. I take each in turn.
First, it seems wrong that in forty years of practice NEPA's structural
weaknesses have never been turned to its advantage. On April 9, 2010,
BP's "Senior Federal Affairs Director," Margaret Laney, sent a letter to
CEQ protesting CEQ's proposed guidance on the tightening of standards
for the adoption and application of NEPA's "categorical exclusions."'
BP's letter should serve as a poignant reminder of the power that agencies'
NEPA choices possess. They often affect regulated entities directly and
vitally. A decision by DOI's OCSLA administrators to prepare an EA in-
stead of a CE could mean months of delay and uncertainty to a party like
BP.'09 If determinations of the kind were to turn on the cooperation and
192-97 (2008). Sunstein's entire discussion of NEPA, it bears mentioning, evidenced a profound dis-
interest in-if not complete disregard for-the information we should currently have on hand as a result
of four decades of experience with NEPA. Id.
105. See, e.g., Oliver A. Houck, Worst Case and the Deepwater Horizon Blowout: There Ought to
Be a Law, 40 ENVTL. L. REP. 11033, 11038-39 (2010).
106. See CALDWELL, supra note 35, at 55-58.
107. See, e.g., HERBERT A. SIMON, ADMINISTRATIVE BEHAVIOR: A STUDY OF DECISION-MAKING
PROCESSES IN ADMINISTRATIVE ORGANIZATIONS 242 (4th ed. 1997).
108. See LETTER FROM MARGARET D. LANEY, SENIOR FED. AFFAIRS DIR., BP AMERICA INC., TO
NANCY SUTLEY, CHAIR, COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, RE: STEPS TO MODERNIZE & REINVIGORATE
NEPA; PROPOSED GUIDANCE: "ESTABLISHING, APPLYING & REVISING CATEGORICAL ExCLUSIONS
UNDER THE NAT'L ENVTL. POLICY Acr" (FEB. 18, 2010), dated APR. 9, 2010, http://www.biological
diversity.org/programs/public_1ands/energy/dirty-energydevelopment/oil-and-gas/gulf oil spill/pdfs/
BPletter toCEQonCEs.pdf. In the letter, Laney reminds CEQ that CE's "are to be favored ...
when an activity can reasonably be shown not to have an effect, cumulatively or individually, on the
environment" after listing all of the CEs MMS had maintained for drilling/exploration activities. Id. at
3.
109. See Jaclyn Lopez, BP's Well Evaded Environmental Review: Categorical Exclusion Policy
Rernains Unchanged, 37 ECOL. L. CURRENTS 93 (2010).
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information-sharing of the affected parties, perhaps some of our informa-
tion deficits could be ameliorated. As part II argued, real blowout fre-
quency and severity data for the Gulf of Mexico and beyond were
"available" in some sense when MMS was preparing its programmatic
EISs, oil spill risk analysis, and EA/FONSI for the Gulf.110 Providing ma-
terial incentives to the "regulated community" to gather and share the best
available information is something NEPA could do if its agents used their
NEPA pivots strategically.
Jarring uncertainties will remain ubiquitous in forecasting environ-
mental futures, for, even where information is actually generated or better
integrated into an EIS, "it appears that relatively little NEPA-generated
information is transmitted unfiltered from government to the citizenry and
back again.". 11 Still, if NEPA is to be the kind of information therapy that
it purports to be,112 its own coercive potential should be used to extend its
reach. Conditioning the use of relatively expedited NEPA processes on the
fullest cooperation and information sharing that an agency can gain from
concerned parties could, in effect, shift some of NEPA's informational bur-
dens. If a party like BP were convinced that its permissions to operate
could be expedited by sharing information available to it with a NEPA ana-
lyst stuck in the dark, it might well decide to share rather than hold out." 3
A quid pro quo-accelerating government decision-making in exchange for
the disclosure of private information-could enhance our total risk aware-
ness in a variety of ways. And for those convinced that the larger, more
comprehensive NEPA document is always better, the realities of NEPA
process should be remembered:
If an EIS were capable of generating high quality informa-
tion at little or no cost, and could arrive in time to influence
the agency decision, then an EIS might be preferable to a
mitigated FONSI [for example]. But if, as the evidence sug-
gests, EISs are typically costly, cumbersome, and largely un-
informative, and arrive too late in the process to shape the
110. See supra notes 46-65 and accompanying text.
111. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA, supra note 16, at 916. "Far more frequently, organ-
ized groups serve as a mediating agent, repackaging and translating the often highly technical informa-
tion contained in an EIS for dissemination to the broader citizenry, and offering their services as the
vehicle through which citizens may attempt to hold their government accountable." Id.
112. Cf Bradley C. Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines: Tackling Information Deficits in Envi-
ronmental Regulation, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1409 (2008) [hereinafter Karkkainen, Bottlenecks and Baselines]
(arguing that NEPA was enacted to address pervasive failures of rationality and required impact assess-
ments in order to subsidize the markets for environmental information but that NEPA's designers
failed to appreciate the true costs of information-gathering, sorting, and processing).
113. Of course, this is not to make the unfounded assumption that regulated parties will never
hold out in such circumstances. They surely will. See, e.g., Mary L. Lyndon, Information Economics
and Chemical Toxicity: Designing Laws to Produce and Use Data, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1795, 1813-14
(1989) (arguing that chemical manufacturers have powerful incentives to avoid learning or disclosing
toxicity data given the consequences that such data can occasion). without much greater power than
we normally give government, though, we can do little to eliminate that possibility completely.
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real decision, then perhaps we could do with fewer of
them . . . .114
Second, frequentist statistics are almost entirely useless in understand-
ing and weighing unprecedented risks. A classical or "frequentist" concep-
tion of probability defines the probability (P) of an event's occurring in a
particular trial as the frequency (f) with which it occurs in a long sequence
of similar trials. P is the value to which the long-run f converges as the
number of trials increases. This is why P is often viewed as a property or
propensity of the system generating the events. One practical trouble with
frequentist conceptions of probability, of course, is that for most events of
any interest we cannot be sure of the relevant population of trials or similar
events. A "subjectivist" alternative stems from the work of the English
mathematician Thomas Bayes. Bayesian probability is best thought of as
the degree of belief an agent can have that an event will occur given all of
the relevant information currently known to that agent. According to
Bayes, because the state of information changes over time and changes for
different agents, there is no such thing as a single P. This "subjectivist"
account is disciplined by what we might call the "axioms" of probability,
though. For example, the P that one of a set of mutually exclusive events
occurs should be the sum of their probabilities." 5 Assuming these axioms,
rationally coherent degrees of belief depend almost entirely on ever-chang-
ing states of information.116  Our so-called Bayesian probabilities must
therefore be updated constantly and by recourse to as many sources of
information as is feasible-making them more like working hypotheses
than usable conclusions.11 7
The unpredictability of environmental outcomes given some action
(A) provokes much of the conflict we see in NEPA practice today. As-
signing a P value to the range of possible outcomes from action A will be of
varying difficulty depending on how far removed the agent is from the out-
come(s), i.e., how many different sources of variability can alter the out-
come(s) from A in the time interval and or the space separating it from our
agent. Without a frequentist distribution of a subject outcome from which
to judge, though, we would seem to be better off committing ourselves to a
permanent and constant updating of our beliefs. We would be better off,
that is, assuming we are willing to bear the costs of decision making that
this kind of "Bayesian" updating entails. And because NEPA assessments
will often come due well in advance of an action A-or of any outcome(s)
114. Karkkainen, Toward a Smarter NEPA, supra note 16, at 935.
115. See HowsoN, supra note 66, at 62-63 (reviewing Kolmogorov axioms).
116. See Itzhak Gilboa, Note: Questions in Decision Theory, 2 ANN. REV. ECON. 1, 8-10 (2009),
available at http://www.tau.ac.il/-igilboa/pdf/GilboaQuestions in DecisionTheory.pdf (exploring the
differences between frequentist probabilities and the constant updating of a "subjectivist" or Bayesian
approach to probability).
117. See HowsoN, supra note 66, at 173-98. Scientifically derived knowledge of causation and the
connections drawn between causal forces and outcomes/effects have a similar structure-and are simi-
larly contrary to some of our legal traditions for that reason. See H.L.A. HART & TONY HONoRGt,
CAUSATION IN THE LAw (2d ed. 1985).
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from A-their practical value as predictions will be low. This is where bet-
ter accounting of our information's value would be, well, invaluable."18
Only by estimating the expected utility of information that could enhance
the agency's (subjective) probability judgments will that agency know how
much to invest in acquiring the object information. 119
Finally, our programmatic NEPA documents, especially those from
which subsequent, more specific decisions are "tiered," must do more to
alert our decision-makers to the risks that have been analyzed in gross, so
to speak, but not yet in particular, while at the same time alerting them to
the blindspots inherent in their own "worldviews," biases, and best-laid
plans. What we now call "scenario planning" seems the most promising
means for doing so. Scenario planning is a family techniques pioneered in
the 1970s both to envision plausible future events and to plot out strategic,
outcome-inducing responses thereto.' 20 It begins with the definition of a
problem: something specific and generally risky. Once the problem has
been identified, no more than a couple of dozen people should brainstorm
"a long list of key factors and environmental forces that might influence the
outcomes[s] of the focal issue." 121 And once that has been done, the group
should settle on no more than a handful of scenario "plots"-stories or
narratives that have a beginning, a middle, and an end.122 Settling on these
plots and populating them with events and forces normally happens in
some kind of workshop the achievement of which is hopefully identifying
"those areas about which we don't know enough about the present and
past, much less the future." 123 Serious workshops of the kind are virtually
unknown to NEPA processes today, overloaded as they have become with
theatrical "public transparency" sessions that play for the record and little
else.
Scenario planning of the sort under NEPA's auspices could incorpo-
rate a kind of continual "Bayesian" updating of event probabilities-as-
suming the action agency could sustain the necessary contact and exchange
with others. With improving communications technology and partnering
118. Those who must acquire information can estimate its expected value in deciding whether it is
worth the trouble to acquire. See BARON, supra note 78, at 177-78.
119. Where this expected utility comes down to disparate expert judgments, the valuation itself
can quickly grow in complexity. Id. at 129-34. Nevertheless, not attempting such analyses is more
impractical still. Cf. id. at 177-78 (likening value of information testing to the practice of modern
medical diagnosis and its selection of diagnostic tools).
120. See JAMES A. OGILVY, CREATING BETTER FUTURES: SCENARIO PLANNING AS A TOOL FOR A
BETTER TOMORROW (2002); PETER SCHWARTZ, THE ART OF THE LONG VIEW: PLANNING FOR THE
FUTURE IN AN UNCERTAIN WORLD (1991).
121. See OGILVY, supra note 120, at 175. Ogilvy notes that it is best if the group is "fairly di-
verse-young and old, male and female, of different ethnicities, with different jobs, and from different
parts of a . . . community-so that the list of key factors and environmental forces is long and varied."
Id. Finally, "[e~xperts are not always the best resources for thinking outside the box, and often what we
are looking for is the unexpected, the unlikely, the key factor that will blindside us if we remain locked
in the tunnel vision of received wisdom." Id.
122. OGILVY, supra note 120, at 176.
123. Id.
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forms, both by interagency workgroups and by agencies tapping their regu-
lated parties, Bayesian updating of the kind is increasingly feasible. Five-
year planning horizons-like those OCSLA and DOI's offices have
adopted-are far too long, though. The prompts for revisiting outdated
scenario plans would have to be much more routine.' 24 In all events,
CEQ's rules on "available" information,12 5 the "purpose and need" of
agency actions in alternatives analyses,126 and its now copious interpreta-
tions of the rules on "tiering"127 ought to be amended by a notice-and-
comment rulemaking to adopt a binding rule that either rewards or, in
some circumstances, requires an agency's use of state-of-the-art scenario
planning in place of the disjointed, disorganized, and discredited ap-
proaches to layered environmental risks that are currently tolerated.128
If true scenario planning is predicated on continuous consultation and
the structured accounting of possible futures, thereby stressing the irreduci-
ble uncertainties, it also entails what we might call imaginative specula-
tion.129  It offers the agent a method of envisioning possible futures,
especially possible futures that might be outside the bounds of conven-
tional thinking.' In this much, scenario planning is less prediction and
forecast than projection and collective hypothesis.'' For the risk of a cata-
strophic spill to have been appropriately discounted by its actual
(im)probability, MMS would have had to have made much better use of all
sources of information available to all knowledgeable actors regarding the
most salient possibilities in its deepwater development plans-including
124. Id.
125. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.22 (2010).
126. Id. § 1502.13 (2010).
127. Id. §§ 1502.20, 1508.28 (2010).
128. A rulemaking of the sort could be as easy as providing for the permitted use of abbreviated
public processes on covered EISs, the amendment of the rules set out above to further specify valid
responses to revealed uncertainties, or by providing that the kind of scenario planning described in text
constitutes full compliance with NEPA § 102(2) for whatever agency "actions" are included therein.
129. See Garry D. Peterson et al., Scenario Planning: A Tool for Conservation in an Uncertain
World, 17 CONSERV. Bto. 358, 360 (2003), available at http://www.technologyforge.net/STMWarsaw/
ScenarioPlanning/ENMA291STReferences/Processes/ToolsForConservation.pdf
130. See Wright & Goodwin, supra note 93, at 318 ("[S]cenario planning interventions in organi-
zations construct multiple frames of the future states of the external world, only some of which may be
well aligned with current strategy."); Peterson et al., supra note 129, at 360 (internal citation omitted)
("Scenarios describe futures that could be rather than futures that will be. In essence, scenarios are
alternative, dynamic stories that capture key ingredients of our uncertainty about the future of a study
system.").
131. See OGILVY, supra note 120, at 101-10; Peterson et al., supra note 120, at 359-61.
Whereas scientists understand that predictions are conditional probabilistic statements, non-
scientists often understand them as things that will happen. . . . In contrast to a prediction, a
forecast is the best estimate from a particular method, model, or individual. The public and
decision-makers generally understand that a forecast may or may not turn out to be true.
Environmental scientists further distinguish projections, which may be heavily dependent on
assumptions about drivers and may have unknown, imprecise, or unspecified probabilities.
Projections lead to "if this, then that" statements.
Peterson et al., supra, at 359 (internal citations omitted).
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the information in the spill response plans required by its own rules, 132 in-
formation about the challenges of drilling in the Gulf of Mexico, 133 and the
information about BPV's disturbingly high failure rates at extreme
depths.134 Instead of remaining the ultima thule-that beyond the borders
of the agency's "known world"-disastrous risks from oil development
might have actually entered the calculus. In that much, we may even gen-
eralize from the BP Macondo disaster and suggest that NEPA's agents
should more routinely stretch their own informational horizons to gather
and synthesize information wherever it might be "available" and to do so
by involving others by whatever means necessary. This more normative
sense of "available" information remains too foreign to NEPA agents to-
day. But it is the sense in which NEPA exercises will actually pursue the
statute's lofty goals of improving our understanding of environmental risk.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
Today's "pressure build"' pushing us and our governments to de-
velop heretofore unrecoverable hydrocarbons is a scenario itself, of
course.13 6 Executive branch decision-makers especially have long known
that our nation is in a tightening vortex where oil is concerned.1 3' The
strategically minded multi-national enterprises whose profits rise with this
building pressure today can even augment it with their mobile capital, mo-
bile businesses, and legal protections as owners."'s They can threaten to
take their expertise and assets elsewhere, undermining a whole nation's
energy plans in turn. And if a political jurisdiction chooses not to develop
the oil reserves in its possession, it guarantees nothing environmentally-
except perhaps that a valuable resource is left in place for some future
agents' exploitation. This is where special-purpose agencies like DOI and
its component bureaus confront the limitations of our multi-agency state
132. See 30 C.F.R. Parts 250 and 254 (2009). MMS rules have long required its operators' spill
response plans include worst-case discharge scenarios and, specifically, the volume of oil in the worst
case discharge scenario. See id. § 254.47.
133. See DEP'T OF INTERIOR SUSPENSION DECISION, supra note 90, at 7-17.
134. See supra note 96 and accompanying text.
135. Cf PETER TERTZAKIAN, A THOUSAND BARRELS A SECOND: THE COMING OIL BREAK POINT
& THE CHALLENGES FACING AN ENERGY DEPENDENT WORLD (2007) (arguing that oil's "energy cycle"
is coming to a "break point" as the pressure builds to find other sources of energy to replace it).
136. See NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, OIL IN THE SEA III: INPUTS, FATES, & EFFEcTs 19-62 (2003)
(reviewing the growing risks of oil pollution in the marine environment as development expands).
137. See, e.g., DANIEL YERGIN, THE PRIZE: THE EPIC QUESTION FOR OIL, MONEY & POWER
(1991). As ultra deepwater exploration continues, new finds are inevitable-but just as likely to shift
and possibly augment the risks of oil development. See, e.g., Joao Lima & Fred Pals, BP's Tiber Find
Underscores Challenges of Deepwater Find, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Sept. 2, 2009, http://www.bloomberg.
comlapps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=AKOcLK9YuSlE.
138. National oil companies control four times the global petroleum reserves that the multina-
tional majors BP, ExxonMobil, Shell, Chevron, ConocoPhillips, and lotal do. See U.S. Energy Info.
Admin., Who Are the Major Players Supplying the World Oil Market?, http://tonto.eia.doe.gov/energy.
in_brief/world_oil_market.cfm. And in virtually every plausible scenario, oil company assets will con-
tinue to grow in the short- to medium term. See, e.g., Charles Roxborough et al., McKinsey Global
Inst., The New Power Brokers: How Oil, Asia, Hedge Funds, and Private Equity Are Faring in the
Financial Crisis 82-86 (2009) (projecting "petrodollar" asset growth in several scenarios).
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and the community of nations to which they belong. Strict regulatory con-
trols on "vessels" like the "mobile offshore drilling units" Transocean,
LLC, operates just encourage their owners to "reflag" them.139 Hard limits
on hydrocarbon development in one place or sector simply drive up prices
and incentives to others to meet what is now a globalized demand. 140 In
the meantime, our energy economy depletes and toxifies more natural cap-
ital every year and statutes like NEPA do nothing to stop or even slow it
substantially. Indeed, from Village of False Pass v. Clark,'4 1 where plain-
tiffs sought a "worst case scenario" analysis of a "major spill" in the Inte-
rior Department's OCSLA leasing plans, to Alaska v. Andrus,'4 2 where
plaintiffs sought the gathering and development of site-specific information
about leasing and drilling in "high risk" waters, to County of Suffolk v.
Secretary,14 3 where plaintiffs sought a comprehensive analysis of the aggre-
gate effects from the Department's leasing plans, to Natural Resources De-
fense Council v. Morton,'" where plaintiffs sought the development of
alternatives to oil as a fuel in an EIS for offshore oil development, the
successive generations of NEPA litigation that have progressively nar-
rowed the statute's planning horizons under the pressures of our energy
economy are like the rings of a dying tree. In these generations we see an
ever-diminishing range of possibilities rather than the promise of more
growth.
We return, then, to NEPA as a system itself, a tool that should enhance
agencies' overall competence.145 Even if it is not necessarily more "worst
case scenario" analyses, NEPA managers today must devise heuristics that
will actually improve our awareness of the environmental costs of our
economy-as-usual-if not in real time, then over time. If, under even im-
proved CEQ rules demanding true scenario planning from its agents,
NEPA documents are going to be wrong in their predictions much of the
139. Transocean LLC, which reportedly owns more than half of all the MODU's worldwide, is
also reported to be one of the most cravenly strategic "reflagging" corporations in the world. See Barry
Meier, Owner of Exploded Rig is Known for Testing Rules, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2010, http://www.ny-
times.com/2010/07/08/business/global/O8ocean.html. The empirical evidence suggests that "races to lax-
ity" in regulatory competition are not as common as was once thought, although flags of convenience
have been the norm in international shipping since World War II. See DALE D. MURPHY, THE STRUC-
TURE OF REGULATORY COMPETITION: CORPORATIONS & PUBLIC POLICIES IN A GLOBAL ECONOMY
45-71 (2004). Vessels like MODUs seem to be primed for reflagging and races-to-laxity, in other
words.
140. Historically, fuel shifts (and locational shifts in the recovery of a traditional fuel) in response
to regulatory or other governmental pressures are common. See TERTZAKIAN, supra note 135.
141. 733 F.2d 605 (9th Cir. 1984).
142. 580 F.2d 465 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
143. 562 F.2d 1368 (2d Cir. 1977).
144. 458 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
145. Cf 42 U.S.C. § 4332(A) (2006) (requiring all agencies to "utilize a systematic, interdiscipli-
nary approach which will insure the integrated use of the natural and social sciences and the environ-
mental design arts in planning and in decision making which may have an impact on man's
environment"); id. at § 4332(B) (requiring all agencies to "identify and develop methods and proce-
dures . . . which will insure that presently unquantified environmental amenities and values may be
given appropriate consideration in decision making along with economic and technical
considerations").
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time (and they surely will be), what would a practically rational agent do
with such analyses? Clearly, if the immediate relevance of such analyses is
substantially compromised by our being human, the direct role of these
analyses in the real-time decisions for which they are connissioned must
not define their horizons. The practically rational agent would optimally
standardize them to make them more usable as an aggregate. The practi-
cally rational agent would engineer such analyses to enable subsequent
meta-analysis of their preparation, content, and function.14 6 Instead of yet
another "guidance" that gently suggests such a systemic approach,
though,1 4 7 CEQ must start acting with more dispatch and purpose, princi-
pally by updating its regulations to reverse the dynamics traced above.
Since Glass and colleagues coined the term in the mid-1970s, meta-
analysis has grown ubiquitous in fields like epidemiology and medicine.
But it remains virtually unknown to agencies like DOI. A meta-analysis
makes the detailed study itself into the unit of observation, aiming to reveal
any underlying regularities that may exist. 148 A major challenge of con-
ducting any meta-analysis is finding the relevant parameters, 14 9 a test that
NEPA's data universe would certainly present to the fullest. But the possi-
ble payoffs are enormous. Indeed, some sort of meta-analytical require-
ment adopted at some point in our first forty years of experience with
NEPA might have substantially deepened MMS's understanding of the un-
certainty absorption-perhaps even the relative probability of catastrophic
oil spills-inherent in its deepwater exploration and production programs.
There is no telling what disaster we might be able to avert in the coming
decades if we act now to get a better grasp of the unpredictable.
146. The "meta-analysis" of NEPA documents suggested depends on their being aggregated and
then subdivided into categories from which similarities and patterns could be drawn. The conclusions
from such analyses that the NEPA performance of an agency (or agency unit) meets or fails to meet
some particular standard, whether as to accuracy, publicity, participation, etc., would be the output
from such meta-analysis.
147. On CEO's over-use of guidance, handbooks, memoranda, circulars, and the like as opposed
to updating its regulations, see Amy L. Stein, Climate Change Under NEPA: A voiding Cursory Consid-
eration of Greenhouse Gases, 81 U. GOLo. L. REV. 473 (2010).
148. Eduardo Fernandez-Duque & Claudia Valeggia, Meta-Analysis: A Valuable Tool in Conser-
vation Research, 8 CONSERV. Bio. 555, 556 (1994).
149.
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